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In response to an article by de Gruijter and Ham-
bleton (1984), some thoughts on the use of decision
theory for setting cutoff scores on mastery tests are
presented. This paper argues that decision theory of-
fers much more than suggested by de Gruijter and
Hambleton and that an attempt at evaluating its poten-
tials for mastery testing should address the full scale
of possibilities. As for the problems de Gruijter and
Hambleton have raised, some of them disappear if
proper choices from decision theory are made, while
others are inherent in mastery testing and will be en-
countered by any method of setting cutoff scores. Fur-
ther, this paper points at the development of new tech-
nology to assist the mastery tester in the application of
decision theory. From this an optimistic attitude to-
wards the potentials of decision theory for mastery
testing is concluded.
In contrast with current notions, tests are more
often used for decision making than for measure-
meant purposes. In fact, one of the few situations
where tests are used as pure measurement instru-
ments is in research, for instance, when reactions
of subjects to varying conditions are measured or
when relationships between variables are to be de-
termined. In all applied fields, though, tests are
predominantly used to make such decisions as ad-
mission to schools, selection of personnel, treat-
ment assignment in therapies, pass-fail decisions
in instructional units, vocational guidance deci-
sions, program and product evaluations, certifica-
tion, placement in the military, and so forth. In the
light of this overwhelming number of applications,
it seems contradictory that psychometricians have
invested so much energy in the improvement of
tests as measurement instruments. For example,
one of the basic differences between the two types
of test uses is that in measurement the concern,
generally, is in uniform accuracy of the instrument
along some part of the scale, whereas in decision
making this is seldom a prerequisite.
A favorable exception to this somewhat one-
sided interest is found in the mastery testing lit-
erature. For the most part, this is due to a seminal
paper by Hambleton and Novick (1973). In their
paper, one of the three ‘6~lassi~s9’ in the history
of criterion-referenced measurement (van der Lin-
den, 9 1982a), the authors proposed the use of
(Bayesian) decision theory to optimize and analyze
cutoff scores on mastery tests. The proposal has
stimulated others to work out decision-theoretic so-
lutions as well, and a great variety of versatile
contributions have followed. Currently, notwith-
standing Glass’s (1978) critical comments (see,
however, Hambleton, 1978; Popham, 1978), sta-
tistical decision theory has been adopted as the
basic paradigm in mastery testing research. In view
of this, de Gruijter and Hambleton’s (1984) paper
is a timely and welcome attempt at evaluating the
progress being made in this area. The paper, how-
ever, strikes the reader by the fact that, despite a
basic trust in the potential of decision theory for
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mastery testing, it has some pessimistic overtones.
These are mainly due to five different obstacles
that, according to the authors, are encountered when
using decision theory to set cutoff scores on tests.
The present reaction is inspired by a somewhat
more optimistic attitude towards the use of decision
theory in mastery testing. In particular, it is felt
that de Gruijter and Hambleton are not correct in
passing their five problems fully to the account of
decision the&reg;ry. Als&reg;9 decision theory offers many
unique advantages that they do not mention but
should be put forward to allow a fair comparison
with alternatives. In the following, some aspects
of decision theory and its potential for use in mas-
tery testing are elucidated further. This is not only
to complete the expose in de Gruijter and Ham-
blet&reg;n9s paper but also to set the stage for a sub-
sequent critical review of the five problems. In the
final section the most important conclusions from
this review are summarized.
and P&reg;~~~~~~1 ~f Decision Theory
In a section entitled &dquo;The Basic Paradigm for
Obtaining Optimal Cut-off Scores,&dquo; de Gruijter and
Hambleton discuss an algorithm for obtaining an
optimal cutoff score on the test adopting an (em-
pirical) Bayesian framework with threshold utility
and assuming an item sampling model. This may
leave the reader who is not familiar with the subject
with the impression that the contribution of deci-
sion theory to mastery testing amounts to this.
The perspective will be broadened some-
what here. Since it is not the intention to offer a
coherent treatment of decision theory, the presen-
tation will be point by point and without any em-
phasis on logical order.
The Nature of Decision Theory
A helpful distinction, which may clarify much
of the discussion, is between decision theory as a
the&reg;~~y vers~s ~ collection of decision rules. The
former corresponds with decision theory as a branch
of statistics concerned with the formal aspects of
decision problems, the definition of classes of de-
cision rules, and the examination of their properties
against certain criteria of optimality. (A standard
reference here is a textbook such as Ferguson’s,
1967.) The latter is a reduction of the former. Such
a reduction is natural in an applied setting where
the main interest is in solving a practical problem
at hand; it may, however, become harmful as soon
as reasonable alternatives are disregarded or what
is applied is no longer understood.
The first thesis this author would defend is that,
even if decision theory in the latter sense is not
applied, i.e., if cutoff scores are not determined
using rules from decision theory, it still is most
useful for those engaged in mastery testing to be
conversant with decision theory in the former sense.
Decision theory allows an exact formulation of the
mastery testing problem, introduces explicit utility
considerations, clarifies the role to be played by
test data in decision making, offers means for ana-
lyzing the behavior of any decision rule (whether
optimal or not), shows under what conditions these
rules take a certain shape, and so forth.
Impact on Mastery Testing
An example of how decision theory has clarified
the mastery testing problem is the following. In
much of the mastery testing literature, it has long
been ignored that mastery testing involves no dif-
ferent cutoff scores. In this tradition, the setting
of the mastery standard and the subsequent infer-
ence whether examinees display mastery or not,
i.e., mastery testing, are confused. Decision the-
ory, on the other hand, helps to neatly distinguish
between a cutoff score on the true score variable
(mastery standard) and the inference rule defined
on the observed test scores, which, under condi-
tions normally satisfied in testing (e.g., Ferguson,
1967, sect. 6.1), takes the shape of a cutoff score
on the test.
It can readily be demonstrated that under their
respective models, popular methods such as the
Angoff and Nedelsky methods yield standards on
the true score scale (van der Linden, 1982b); these
methods are, as opposed to common belief, not
methods for setting cutoff scores on tests. On the
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other hand, for instance, Berk’s (1976) contrasting
groups method and Zieky and Livingston’s (1977)
borderline group method aim at observed test score
distributions and are, again in contrast with com-
mon belief, not standard-setting methods.
Ignoring one of the two cutoff score problems,
as in the aforementioned methods, amounts to as-
suming that the test is free of measurement error,
exactly the same misunderstanding as ignoring the
difference, say, between a true and an observed
test score or between an attenuated and a disatten-
uated correlation coefficient. Even Glass (1978),
in his otherwise lucid (but controversial) paper,
mistakenly classifies decision theory as a standard-
setting method-and subsequently blames it for the
fact that it appears to rest on a mastery standard!
Decision-theoretic techniques are not substitutes for
standard-setting methods but must follow each time
such a method is used to allow decisions to be
based on fallible test data.
Behavior of Cutoff Scores
An example of how decision-theoretic analysis
can reveal the behavior of a decision rule can be
given using de Gruijter and Hambleton’s example
of the (empirical) Bayes cutoff score under thresh-
old loss. It is shown how the behavior of this op-
timal cutoff score has a noteworthy dependency on
the true score distribution. Suppose that, in these
authors’ notation, the distribution shows many ex-
aminees with 1T> vo and only a few with Tr < &dquo;ITo-
As the substitution a = c = 0 yields no loss of
generality, the expected utility associated with the
optimal cutoff score may be written as
whereas it further seems obvious to assume that b,
d < 0 (lower utility for incorrect than for correct
decisions). Now, for the given population, it holds
that B, the probability of a false master, and D,
the probability of a false nonmaster, tend to 0 and
ProbIX < x,l, respectively. In such cases it thus
holds approximately that
and it follows that the expected utility tends to be
maximal for a low value of x~.
In educational terms this implies that hard-work-
ing populations are rewarded by low cutoff scores.
The same analysis shows that low-performing pop-
ulations are penalized by high cutoff scores. This
behavior of the optimal value of x, was documented
for the case of threshold utility by Mellenbergh,
Koppelaar, and van der Linden the same
reward mechanism was observed for the case of
linear utility by van der Linden and Mellenbergh
( 1977). As the phenomenon is due to the basic fact
the Bayesian solutions use regression functions in
the opposite direction, it was coined the &dquo;regrets-
sion from the mean effect&dquo; in a treatment by van
der Linden (1980).
Analysis
As noted earlier, decision-theoretic analysis are
most useful even if no decision-theoretic optimi-
zation takes place. The foregoing point illustrated
a result of such an analysis that may be of avail
when selecting cutoff scores on a more intuitive
basis. Another example of an analysis useful in
mastery testing is robustness analysis, also men-
tioned by de Gruijter and Hambleton.
As decision theory is based on a complete map-
ping of the mastery testing problern, it is the proper
framework for studying the robustness of decision
rules. A recent study relevant to mastery testing is
Vijn and Molenaar (1981). Their approach is in-
novative in that it adopts the concept of a robustness
region as the total set of all parameter specifications
and assumptions for which the same decision is
optimal. The identification of such regions can take
place prior to the selection of a specific decision
rule and provides valuable information to the de-
cision maker that may assist him/her in the choice
of a rule, even if this is not exclusively based on
decision-theoretic optimization.
Selection, Placement, and Classification
It is worthwhile to look beyond the mastery test-
ing problem and to see how decision theory clarifies
other decision problems in educational and psy-
chological testing as well. In general, three other
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basic types of decisions can be distinguished: se-
lection, placement, and classification decisions.
Selection decisions have been treated decision
theoretically by Cronbach and Gleser (1965). This
monograph was one of the first attempts to base
test applications on statistical decision theory. So-
lutions to the placement decision problem have also
been given in Cronbach and Gleser, whereas the
decision-theoretic approach to this type of decision
was developed further in van der Linden (1981).
Decision theory of classification problems still re-
mains to be elaborated.
Elsewhere the author shows that it is possible to
treat these four basic types of decisions in a unified
fashion using (empirical) Bayesian decision theory
(van der Linden, in press). Within this framework
it is also possible to deal with conditions occa-
sionally met in practice such as quota restrictions, 9
multivariate test information, or the presence of
differential reaction to test items by subpopulations
of testees (culture-fair testing problem). Such a
unified approach will enable mastery testing re-
search to profit from solutions to other types of
decision problems as well.
Moreover, modem educational systems such as
computer-aided instruction or other forms of in-
dividualized instruction are usually constructed as
systems with several points at which mastery, clas-
sification, or placement decisions have to be made.
Though this has to be worked out further, decision
theory in principle opens the possibility to optimize
such systems simultaneotisly, no doubt yielding
better solutions than when these decisions are op-
timized separately. It seems unlikely that a more
intuitive approach or an approach based on a less
complete mapping of decision problems will ad-
dress such problems successfully.
of Theory
Though decision theory gives the impression of
a unified theory, nevertheless, important subdivi-
sions are present. One of the differences concerns
the way decision rules are ordered to choose the
most preferred (or optimal) rule. It is here where,
e.g., Bayesian decision theory and minima theory
go different ways, confronting the mastery tester
with an important choice. The advantages of min-
imax theory for mastery testing have been set forth
in papers by Huynh (1980) and Veldhuizen (1982).
Another choice is whether or not (subjective) prior
knowledge as to true states is allowed (Bayesian
versus empirical Bayesian theory). Also, within
these frameworks further choices are necessary as
to the utility structure and the test model to be
adopted.
A review of utility functions and test models
current in mastery testing is given in van der Linden
(1980). The important thing to note here is that
each of these subdivisions and specifications im-
pose different conditions on the application of de-
cision theory to mastery testing. Consequently, as
will be shown more in detail below, de Gruijter
and Hambleton’s five problems cannot hold uni-
versally.
De Gruijter and Haiubleten’s Five Obstacles
The foregoing has set the stage for a critical
review of de Gruijter and ~~~bl~t&reg;r~9s five prob-
lems. The author’ premises in this review are that
(1) some of these problems are inherent in mastery
testing and not in the application of decision theory;
(2) some of these problems depend on what choices
are made from decision theory, and may disappear
when proper choices are made; and (3) for some
of these problems new technology to aid the de-
cision maker in his/her choices is being developed
and should be developed further.
Cutoff on Various Occasions
This point illustrates that some of the problems
raised by de Gruijter and Hambleton pertain to
problems inherent in mastery testing and its edu-
cational context, and not to the application of de-
cision theory. Every other conceivable method of
setting cutoff scores on tests will run up against
the same phenomenon-that in a series of test
administrations students, when preparing for a test,
tune their efforts to results on previous adminis-
trations. For example, it is a common experience
among teachers that classes and exams known as
easy to students are usually taken less seriously.
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De Gruijter and Hambleton are correct in their ob-
servation that such interactions between cutoff score
and students’ learning, despite a common mastery
standard, generally lead to a series of different
optimal cutoff scores. Unlike these authors, how-
ever, this is not viewed as a criticism of decision
theory in this paper.
As a first comment, it is noted that the suggestion
that this interaction leads to a decrease in the ex-
pected utility associated with the optimal cutoff
score, and thus to a loss incurred by the educational
institution, is not correct. In their example, the
authors compare only the two right-hand terms of
their Equations 7 and 8 under the assumption a
> c. A similar comparison of the two left-hand
terms reveals that under the obvious assumption of
unchanged distributions of X given TT, it holds that
B* > B and D* < D (an increase in the number of
true nonmasters leads to a decrease in the number
of false nonmasters and an increase in the number
of false masters). ~’hus, if b > d - (a - c),
which may compensate for de Gruijter and Ham-
bleton’s Equation 9. Whether a loss or a profit is
incurred depends fully on the utility structure of
the mastery testing problem involved. The same
conclusion follows for a % c.
The fact that students may show the above be-
havior is not an argument against but just an im-
portant case for the application of decision theory
to mastery testing. Only (Bayesian) decision theory
does allow for changes in true score distributions.
The correct conclusion from analyses such as
de Gruijter and Hambleton is not that loss or profit
is incurred but that more loss or less profit than
necessary will be incurred if decision- theoretic op-
timization is omitted.
It is known how the optimal (or Bayes) cutoff
score behaves as a function of the true score dis-
tribution. This is precisely the &dquo;regression from
the mean effect&dquo; mentioned earlier. If the true
score distribution moves up to the left, the optimal
cutoff score rises; if it moves in the other direction,
it drops. For a series of test administrations with
the same mastery standard, this effect creates a
perfect negative feedback mechanism. In the long
run it may force students to maintain their study
efforts at an acceptable level. It is instructive to
compare this with norm-referenced cutoff score
setting (e.g., grading on the curve). These cutoff
scores vary up and down with the performance of
students. Discord with this uncritical automatism
led to the mastery testing movement, which in
Bayesian decision theory finds not only optimal
decision rules but also a possible control mecha-
nism for maintaining acceptable study efforts with
respect to its fixed mastery standards.
The Cutoff Score as a Target for Examinees
The requirement that students should be in-
formed of standards beforehand to let them know
what they are expected to meet seems sensible for
many educational situations. Before embarking on
some comments on this point raised by de Gruijter
and Hambleton, two things are noted. First, iron-
ically, it is exactly this requirement that creates the
problem in the foregoing section. As soon as stu-
dents are informed of standards in advance, they
may use information on previous test administra-
tions to react in the above fashion. Second, it is
noted that the same situation can arise because of
other reasons, for instance, item analysis or cali-
bration previous to test scoring. The requirement
is thus not exclusive to the application of decision
theory.
Whether or not this requirement is problematic
depends on what choices from decision theory are
made. In minimax theory, for example, cutoff scores
are not based on maximization of expected utility
and are generally not dependent on previously un-
known distribution parameters. Hence minimax
cutoff scores can be set prior to test administration
without any problem (for details, see Huynh, 1980;
Veldhuizen, 1982).
If mastery testers prefer (empirical) Bayesian
theory, several strategies to reduce the problem are
available. Following are three suggestions: First,
of course, it is always possible to inform students
of the mastery standard and to explain to them how
Bayesian optimization works. In particular, the
regression from the mean effect can be explained,
possibly with some numerical demonstrations, so
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that students are able to assess the effects of their
preparation. Second, students could be provided
with the mastery standard and an interval of pos-
sible cutoff score values. The eventual cutoff score
is then selected optimally from this interval after
the administration of the test. The loss associated
with this procedure can be negligible if the interval
is calculated from ranges of realistic values of dis-
tribution parameters. Moreover, the procedure pro-
vides students with a meaningful target, especially
if they understand how the eventual choice from
the interval depends on their study efforts.
Third, the cutoff score can be set in advance
using deliberate guesses of parameter values. What
parameter values need to be substituted depends
on the test model and the utility structure adopted.
For the classical test model and linear utility, only
relatively innocent parameters such as the mean of
the observed score distribution and the test relia-
bility have to be estimated (van der Linden & Mel-
lenbergh, 1977). Estimates can be based on results
from comparable test administration and/or impres-
sions of the students’ preparation. Substitution of
various estimates to evaluate the behavior of the
cutoff score (robustness analysis) seems valuable
and suggests the development of interactive com-
puter programs to assist the mastery tester in his/
her definitive choice. Strategies such as those above
circumvent the problem of cutoff scores as targets
and lead, in the sense of the expected utility cri-
terion, to better results than cutoff scores set be-
forehand solely on an intuitive basis.
Choice of Subpopulations
The choice of subpopulations, put forward as a
problem by de Gruijter and Hambleton, is not in-
herent in decision theory or in its applications.
Nothing in decision theory compels the distinguish-
ing of subpopulations or even considering the sam-
pling of students. The use of a less than perfectly
reliable test (measurement error) is already a suf-
ficient reason to apply decision theory. In such
cases, the only &dquo;population&dquo; involved in the ap-
plication of empirical Bayesian theory referred to
by de Gruijter and Hambleton is the empirical true
score distribution of the students who took the test
and for whom a decision has to be made. There is
no doubt whatsoever as to who do or do not belong
to this &dquo;population.&dquo; On the other hand, decision
theory is quite able to deal with student sampling
and subpopulation structures when confronted with
the necessity to do so.
The point to be noted, however, is that the ne-
cessity to distinguish subpopulations arises from
the mastery testing problem and its educational or
societal context and not from the application of
decision theory. Any other method of standard set-
ting will meet the same problem as it arises.
The distinction between possible subpopulations
was made first in testing for selection. There the
fact that test items may be biased against minority
groups led to societal protests and created the prob-
lem of culture-fair selection. As Gross and Su (1975)
and Petersen and Novick (1976) have argued con-
vincingly, fair selection is a question of utilities.
A selection procedure is ’fair&dquo; if the utility struc-
ture underlying its selection rule reflects the utilities
of those involved in the selection process (see also
Mellenbergh & van der Linden, 1981). These au-
thors have demonstrated how decision theory can
be applied to solve the culture-fair selection prob-
lem. This application supposes that the definition
of group membership has been solved. If no closed
definition of group membership is available, the
problem as such is ill defined; and for ill-defined
problems, however urgently they are felt, simply
no satisfying solutions are possible.
It remains to be seen if the issue of culture fair-
ness will become as important in mastery testing
as in testing for selection. Mastery testing usually
takes place in a series of small instructional units
and in such situations less is at stake than in, e.g.,
college admission. But if the issue arises, decision
theory can be used to solve well-defined problems
successfully, whereas it is unclear as yet how al-
temative methods could address even such prob-
lems.
Choice of Test Model and Inaccurate
Parameter Estimates
These two problems are taken together here be-
cause, to some extent, they depend on each other.
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What model is chosen determines the parameters
to be estimated; conversely, the choice of the test
model may be determined by the availability of
accurate estimation methods. Like de Gruijter and
Hambleton, the problems of determining mastery
standards and utility parameters will be dealt with
here though they do not necessarily involve statis-
tical estimation.
The problem of parameter estimation and the
propagation of its errors in solutions for practical
problems is a delicate one and deserves adequate
attention. This holds for decision theory as well as
for any other approach involving parametric mod-
eling. The author’s point of view in the present
problem is that it should be reduced as far as pos-
sible. In order to achieve this the mastery tester
has a full range of options from decision theory
and psychometric theory at his/her disposal and
may have support from a developing new decision-
making technology (see the examples below).
Whether distribution parameters have to be es-
timated depends on several choices, For instance,
if minimax theory is chosen and the simple binomi-
al model is assumed to hold, no estimation of dis-
tribution, test, or item parameters is required. Other
solutions assume only weak models, for example,
in the linear utility model where no more than the
classical test model with Kelley’s regression line
is required (van der Linden ~b Mellenbergh, 1977).
In this model only estimates of the mean observed
score and the classical test reliability need to be
provided. More involved models, such as the em-
pirical beta-binomial model, have more parameters
to be estimated and may require considerable sets
of test data. Also, as noted by de Gruijter and Ham-
bleton, there may be the risk of model misfit.
The (well-known) lesson from this is that the
decision maker should aim at the weakest test model
compatible with his/her choice from decision and
utility theory. It is advisable to already be aware
of the pros and cons of available options when
setting up the testing procedure. For example, the
use of item sampling and compound binomial models
can be circumvented by item banking techniques.
Item banking with calibrated items permits system-
atic item selection, and the selection of items with
the same success probability at the mastery stan-
dard is a sufficient condition for applying minimax
theory under the simple binomial model. Item
banking also prevents the problem of the relation-
ship between Tr and dwelt on by de Gruijter and
Hambleton,.
As for the determination of so, de Gruijter and
Hambleton have made some useful proposals.
However, the most obvious proposal, namely, the
use of standard-setting methods, seems to be over-
looked. (These methods must, of course, be gen-
uine standard-setting methods, and not methods
ignoring the essential difference between standards
and cutoff scores; see above.) Among the most
popular methods are Angoff’s and Nedelsky’s.
Elsewhere the author has presented empirical re-
sults showing that these methods suffer from se-
rious inaccuracy due to inconsistent specifications
of the success probabilities (van der Linden, 1982b).
It is, however, possible to improve the accuracy
of these methods (of which the former is preferable
on many grounds) to any desired level ( 1 ) by trans-
forming them into interactive procedures confront-
ing the standard setter with intermediate results and
(2) by requesting him/her to reconsider inconsistent
specifications until a satisfactory result is obtained.
(For the methodology needed for these procedures,
see van der Linden, 1982b. Work is in progress to
develop computer dialogues to implement these in-
teractive procedures.)
A comparable approach to the choice of utility
functions has already been implemented in CADA,
an interactive computer program by Novick, Isaacs,
and Dekeyrel (1977). Although, in principle, any
psychological scaling method could be used to as-
sist the decision maker in specifying his/her utili-
ties, the application of such new technology as this
computer-based utility determination is especially
suited to educational settings. The same holds for
the development of computer-based methods of
standard setting above. In many educational set-
tings computers have come to stay, and the in-
creasing number of applications of item banking
and computer-aided testing are excellent environ-
ments in which the use of this new technology
could flourish.
Another area where comparable computer pro-
grams are welcome is in the possibility of inter-
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active robustness or sensitivity analysis alrcady al-
luded to above. In this application the program
assists the decision maker in evaluating the effect
of minor deviations from his/her parameter speci-
fications on the resulting cutoff score. A robust
cutoff score in the range of parameter values in-
vestigated may be reassuring to the decision maker;
a sensitive score, on the other hand, may be a
reason to revise the specifications. Such analyses
may cover the simultaneous variation of utility
function parameters and test model parameters (e.g.,
within the range of their standard error of esti-
mation) but also only the latter, for example, to
evaluate the effect of a priori estimates with stan-
dard setting previous to the test administration (see
above). The challenge is to develop user-oriented
program packages which converse with the user in
an understandable way and do not bother him/her
with technicalities.
and Conclusions
In the foregoing, attention has been paid to the
fact that decision theory has to offer much to mas-
tery testing theory and practice. In response to five
problems put forward by de Gruijter and Hamble-
ton it has been indicated that some of these prob-
lems are associated with specific choices from de-
cision theory and disappear if other, possibly more
sensible, choices are made. Other problems ap-
peared to be universal to mastery testing and are
met by any method of setting cutoff scores. These
problems are thus not inherent in the application
of decision theory. Finally, this paper has described
a developing new technology that may aid the de-
cision maker in his/her choice of parameter values.
All this is not to suggest that decision theory
offers perfect solutions to any practical mastery
testing problem. Using the full potential of decision
theory is not a matter of routine, and in many
situations requiring quick and easy solutions the
application of decision theory may have to cope
with suboptimal conditions. It is, however, clearly
superior to other methods that have been proposed
for the same problems and that are incorrect or just
intuitive in character. When the choice is between
the application of decision theory and one of these
alternatives, the former should be chosen. Or, in
other words, with a motto that should guide any
practical problem solving: As long as the perfect
is impossible, the best should be preferred.
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